|
Post by samitch on Feb 17, 2016 1:43:56 GMT
I enjoyed most of Butler's essay after having read Althusser, in particular, her discussion on the power of grammar and the means by which the reproduction of linguistic skills constitutes us as subjects, which was an interesting element of the subjectivation process. However, one element of Althusser and Butler that I found myself struggling to grasp was the structuralist foundations of their work and the manner in which structures (usually capitalist ones) inform ideology. For me though, I wonder what, for folks like Butler and Althusser, comes before the structure? Similarly, what for post-structuralists and post-modernists comes before ideology?
I know this may seem like a "chicken or the egg" question, but it is one question that no one seems to clearly interrogate. I'd like to get an idea of what you all think on this issue because, although this week's readings focus on the processes of becoming subjected to ideology, what comes before ideology? Also, do you all personally identify as structuralist or post-structuralists and how does that inform your own work?
|
|
|
Post by jjnickell on Feb 17, 2016 2:29:14 GMT
That is a really difficult question, and I think that it depends on the way that we define ideology. For example, if we roll with the most popular of Marx's usages of the term in which ideology refers to bourgeoisie lies fed to the proletariat in order to perpetuate and justify class disparity, I think that regardless of your position as a structuralist or post-structuralist, you have to indicate that structure and materiality is the prior condition to ideology.
That said, I think that if we roll with the more modern interpretations of ideology, whether the "shared social frameworks" generic definition or Hall's and Althusser's more particular definition ("systems of representation - composed of concepts, ideas, myths, or images - in which men and women live their imaginary relations to the real conditions of existence", Hall, p. 103), we are forced to locate ideology within discursive fields. Thus, if ideology must be shared and must steeped through discourse, then I have to conclude that rhetoric is the force that preceded ideology. And (not to be repetitive) that said, a manifested ideology then creates the basis for what types of rhetorics can or should be issued. So for me, rhetoric and ideology have a cyclical relationship now, but rhetoric is necessarily the prior condition.
Because of that stance, I would myself identity as a post-structuralist. This perspective informs my own work by allowing me to locate rhetoric and the meaning it produces as the sources for the structures and conditions, as well as the lenses through which we interpret lived experiences. Viewing rhetoric as such a powerful force is what, for me, gives rhetorical scholarship its urgency.
|
|
|
Post by swalker on Feb 17, 2016 7:39:10 GMT
I think you've asked a question that none of our authors would be able to agree upon the answer to. I like Jake's interpretations of ideology here, with the caveat that I am not sure that "structure" and "materiality" are all that different from the post-structuralist's "rhetoric" as the pre-ideology. After all, in order to build the structures which create the materiality, the bourgeoisie must first convince an infrastructure to accept their terms as true. Butler (I appear to be quoting her a lot tonight) would argue that the proletariat must first agree to be subjected to the structure - likely through repeated and encouraged actions which spawn a particular belief eventually. Althusser argues in the beginning of Ideologies that the wage is the persuasive appeal made to quiet and control the infrastructure. So, maybe rhetoric - those "bourgeoisie lies" is really at the heart of it all, no matter what paradigm you fall under. As you might be able to tell, I am myself a post-structuralist. I buy a much more Butlerian view that because even our existence and recognition is socially constructed through both discourse and embodied performance, it becomes necessary to interrogate deeper and at a more individualized level the persuasive patterns which create, maintain, and restrict action.
|
|