Post by jjnickell on Mar 8, 2016 23:39:31 GMT
Obviously, much of Austin’s discussion was written in the context of actual vocalized speech, but there are a few instances in which he indicates that the written word can function as a performative as well. This thought, coupled with his explanation that “There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances….” (p. 14), made me think about the concept of the signature. Often, in our accepted conventional procedures, an act is not done or performed until the individual performing the act offers her or his written signature. In fact, according to our conventions, failure to offer a signature results in what Austin referred to as “misfires” in his second lecture, and whatever act that is meant to be performed – the creation of a deed or will, the transfer of funds, etcetera – is rendered void. Does this mean that a signature is a performative? I find this interesting to consider because several of the examples of performatives that Austin provides, such as the marriage – “I do” and “I pronounce you married” – do not actually perform an act themselves. Rather, it is (at least in our society’s conventions) the act of signatures that functions as the "official" performative speech.